Myanmar and India's national interest

10 January 2006 

Besides restraining China, India must prevent the US from fomenting trouble in its strategic neighbourhood in the east, says P Stobdan. 

There are embryonic signs of the US turning the heat on Myanmar next. A "one-off briefing" on Myanmar, given informally by Deputy Secretary General Ibrahim Gambari on December 17, 2005, marked the first time the UN Security Council discussed the country on an official level.  

The US insistence for a UNSC briefing followed Tatmadow's extension of Ms Aung San Suu Kyi's house arrest and an earlier UN Committee resolution condemning Myanmar's human rights abuse. The US is upbeat about the briefing and expects to push the issue of political change in Myanmar further. 

Interestingly, in the recent months, Washington has raised Myanmar's growing threat to international peace and security, citing problems caused by illicit narcotics, human rights abuses, internal repression - destroying villages, targeting minorities and forcing people to flee the country. The US also mentions the junta seeking nuclear capabilities. In the recent APEC meeting in Busan, President George Bush pledged to help restore democracy in Myanmar, while Ms Condoleezza Rice viewed the junta as "one of the worst regimes in the world." In July, President Bush signed the Burma Freedom and Democracy Act that banned imports from Myanmar. 

What came on the heels of recent US assertion was the 124-page report by the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), revealing the junta's "brutal and systematic" abuse of political prisoners (1,100 prisoners still under detention).  

President Bush's meeting with a Shan human rights campaigner, Charm Tong, indicated the gravity. The junta's move to new capital Pyinmana, triggered by its fear of a possible US attack, displaced thousands. The ILO was irked by the report of extensive forced labour used for construction of Army camps. Myanmar has threatened to opt out of the ILO's membership.  

The campaign to get Myanmar on the UNSC has been underway for some time. The reports of Nobel laureates Vaclav Havel and Desmond Tutu, "Threat to the peace: A call for the UN Security Council to Act in Burma", influenced the world body. The victory of blocking Myanmar from ASEAN chairmanship for 2006 seems to have encouraged the West to push for change.  

The UN remains critical of Ms Suu Kyi's detention. But China, Russia and other council members reject Myanmar's situation posing a threat to international peace and security. Despite the ouster of Beijing's favourite, Khin Nuynt, China supports junta. As Wen Jiabao said in July, China will not change its Myanmar policy "no matter how the international situation fluctuates". 

The Bush Administration's alarm bell about Myanmar acquiring WMD is significant. Yangon acquiring ballistic missiles and announcement to develop a nuclear facility with Russian Minatom's assistance since 2002 raised the eyebrows of many. The project, stalled earlier due to financial reasons, seems to have revived now. Minatom is to construct 10 mega-watt pool-type reactors in Kyaukse near Mandalay. However, the IAEA team that visited Myanmar in 2001, doubted the country's preparedness to maintain safety standards. There were reports suggesting North Korea taking over the project from Russia. Pakistani nuclear experts, too, have been visiting Myanmar since 2001, which include a recent delegation led by Zaifullah to Pyinmana. These developments, along with the junta's plans to acquire an additional squadron of Russian MIG-25, raise the growing suspicions of Myanmar becoming the next rogue state for America. 

The junta's reconvening on December 5 the National Convention (NC) to draft a new constitution as part of its 'Seven-step Roadmap' to form a "genuine and disciplined democratic system" lacks specific timeframe or itinerary; indeed, of important details of "transition process". The chart shows the junta effectively controlling all the procedures and processes of "democratisation". Tatmadow wants to exercise complete control over the road and the map. Tatmadow's new law No. 5/96 severely restricts open debate which could be enforced against those offering new format.  

The Opposition equally remains steadfast on restricting Tatmadow's future role in politics. The ceasefire with insurgents appears fragile; more so with those outside the legal fold who may seek higher protection of rights. These, along with power struggle within the junta that became intense after Khin Nyunt's departure, could derail the NC process. The lack of the NC's credibility is another issue as Western powers threw their weight behind the Opposition's legitimacy.  

The junta, however, considers the NC moving at delicate political stage; and, as such, release of Ms Suu Kyi and Tin Oo could disrupt the process. Their release is unlikely to come about until the main principle of constitution is ready and the way is clear for a referendum. Ms Suu Kyi's popularity undoubtedly remains intact, but some of the pro-democracy groups and ranks within NLD are not happy with her leadership style.  

The blocking of the chairmanship for Yangon has exposed ASEAN's credibility. So far, neither the ASEAN's engagement strategy nor the punitive sanction policy used by the US and the EU has produced any positive results. A section in the US thinks that sanctions would not work against Myanmar because it is a pre-industrial state that can limp along on its own. There is merit in this argument.

Tatmadow cannot be wished away easily. But the junta's rationalisation to exercise power for protecting the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity appears to be both an exaggeration and an illusion. In the context of the failure of the West and the ASEAN, there is a need to break the impasse. The UN, along with China, India and Thailand, should start the trilateral process under the "1+3 framework" to map out an action plan as a starting point for an agreed, workable approach to break the vicious cycle of exaggerated expectations and ground realities. 

After securing the confidence of all the concerned parties, the group could work out phased procedures and mechanisms to assist the reconciliation process. The group should guarantee Myanmar's security interests. A coordinated EU, US, Japan and ASEAN approach by way of economic measures in support of the "1+3" is necessary. Once the action plan is accepted, the West could lift sanctions. Meanwhile, the UN should consider mollifying the Tatmadow by engaging its professional military in international peace-keeping and peace-building missions.  

India cannot ignore China's changing Myanmar policy. Beijing could be making the conciliatory gesture towards the Opposition without antagonising the junta, with the belief that without the NLD's participation, the process could be long and difficult. India has quietly supported the democratic process in Myanmar.  

If we are not careful, the democratic agenda supported by India could be usurped by China. India's national interest also lies in preventing the US fomenting crisis in its strategic neighbourhood. 

(The writer is a senior fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses)